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Abstract
Certain theories suggest that it should be difficult or impossible to eradicate a vaccine-preventable disease under voluntary
vaccination: Herd immunity implies that the individual incentive to vaccinate disappears at high coverage levels. Historically,
there have been examples of declining coverage for vaccines, such as MMR vaccine and whole-cell pertussis vaccine, that
are consistent with this theory. On the other hand, smallpox was globally eradicated by 1980 despite voluntary vaccination
policies in many jurisdictions. Previous modeling studies of the interplay between disease dynamics and individual
vaccinating behavior have assumed that infection is transmitted in a homogeneously mixing population. By comparison,
here we simulate transmission of a vaccine-preventable SEIR infection through a random, static contact network. Individuals
choose whether to vaccinate based on infection risks from neighbors, and based on vaccine risks. When neighborhood size
is small, rational vaccinating behavior results in rapid containment of the infection through voluntary ring vaccination. As
neighborhood size increases (while the average force of infection is held constant), a threshold is reached beyond which the
infection can break through partially vaccinated rings, percolating through the whole population and resulting in
considerable epidemic final sizes and a large number vaccinated. The former outcome represents convergence between
individually and socially optimal outcomes, whereas the latter represents their divergence, as observed in most models of
individual vaccinating behavior that assume homogeneous mixing. Similar effects are observed in an extended model using
smallpox-specific natural history and transmissibility assumptions. This work illustrates the significant qualitative differences
between behavior–infection dynamics in discrete contact-structured populations versus continuous unstructured
populations. This work also shows how disease eradicability in populations where voluntary vaccination is the primary
control mechanism may depend partly on whether the disease is transmissible only to a few close social contacts or to a
larger subset of the population.
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Introduction
Model-based analyses of vaccination programmes have often
concluded that it should be difficult or impossible to eradicate a
vaccine-preventable disease under a voluntary vaccination policy
without other incentives [1–10]. As vaccination coverage increas-
es, the disease becomes increasingly rare due to herd immunity.
Eventually, the infection risk to susceptible individuals decreases to
zero, while the individual risk due to the vaccine remains constant.
Hence, the individual motive to vaccinate is also reduced to zero
as vaccine coverage increases. This should be true, in principle,
even for a disease such as smallpox with very high case fatality
rates, as long as the infection risk is deemed sufficiently small. This
effect, similar to the ‘‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’’ has also been explored
in game theoretical analyses of infectious disease dynamics and
vaccination [3–6,8,9]. In game theoretical treatments, it has been
shown that vaccine coverage beyond the eradication threshold is
not a Nash equilibrium if vaccine risk is nonzero, because a small
group of individuals can achieve a higher payoff by switching to a
nonvaccinator strategy [4]. Such strategic, self-interested behavior
has been suggested as a possible contributor to vaccine scares in
countries with a voluntary vaccination policy, such as England &
Wales, which experienced declines in vaccine uptake for pertussis
in the 1970s [4,5,11], and in measles–mumps–rubella (MMR)
vaccine uptake more recently [12]. Recent work has explored
exceptions to this rule, for instance finding cases of multiple
equilibria when virulence varies with age [13] and when vaccines
are sufficiently imperfect [14].
To date, smallpox is the only vaccine-preventable disease ever
to have been globally eradicated [15], although polio is closer to
eradication than ever before [16]. The last foothold of smallpox
was in low-income countries, particularly in Africa and South Asia
[17]. Jurisdictions in these countries often had widely varying
vaccination policies. For instance, vaccination was compulsory in
some Indian states, but voluntary in others [10]. Even in the final
stages of eradication, when outbreaks were becoming less frequent,
individuals often continued to voluntarily opt for vaccination,
without the benefit of individual financial incentives to vaccinate.
If the foregoing theories are correct that diseases cannot generally
be eradicated under voluntary vaccination, how was smallpox
globally eradicated despite voluntary vaccination in some
jurisdictions?
Most, if not all, previous mathematical models that analyze
discrepancies between individually and socially optimal vaccina-
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populations without spatial or social contact structure (e.g. social
networks), and where populations are large enough for the
continuum approximation to apply. This also appears to be true of
behavior-infection models more generally [18], including those
that study vaccine supply-demand dynamics at the international
level, and non game-theoretical treatments of the problem. In
these previous analyses, populations are generally considered to be
homogeneously mixing, meaning that individuals are as likely to
be infected by a member of their own household as they are by
someone from the general public. However, the inadequacy of
homogenous mixing models for certain situations has been widely
documented, as have the differences between the predictions of
homogeneous-mixing models and models where transmission is
constrained to take place on a contact network [19–23]. In the
present context, the homogeneous mixing assumption is arguably
a good approximation for highly transmissible diseases spread
primarily through aerosol droplets, such as measles. However, the
assumption seems less valid for diseases that are transmitted
through close contact, such as sexually-transmitted infections.
Despite a few spectacular and widely reported cases of aerosol
transmission [24], smallpox is also spread primarily through close
contact, and typically requires prolonged face-to-face contact [25].
Here, we show that disease dynamics under a voluntary
vaccination policy are substantially and qualitatively altered by
the introduction of individual-level social contact structure. We
analyze a social contact network model, where each node
represents an individual, and each link represents a close contact
through which infection may spread. Individuals decide whether
or not to vaccinate based upon their expected payoffs for
vaccinating versus not vaccinating. We assume the vaccine is free
to individuals, which describes the situation for many major
pediatric vaccines in advanced countries, as well as the situation
under the WHO smallpox eradication program in the 1970s. We
first study epidemics on this contact network for a general vaccine-
preventable infection with simplified SEIR-type (Susceptible-
Exposed-Infectious-Recovered) disease history. At baseline pa-
rameter values, for small neighborhood sizes, outbreaks are
quickly contained using only voluntary ring vaccination. As the
neighborhood size increases while infection risk (force of infection)
is held constant, a threshold neighborhood size is reached. Above
this threshold, voluntary vaccination fails and the population
experiences both a considerable final epidemic size and a large
number vaccinated. Hence, the limit of large neighborhood size in
this model recovers dynamics similar to those of homogeneous
mixing models. Because the force of infection is held constant as
neighborhood size increases, the failure of voluntary vaccination is
attributable solely to a decrease in how localized disease
transmission is on the network. We associate smaller neighbor-
hood sizes with close contact infections such as smallpox, and
larger neighborhood sizes with diseases that do not require close
contact for transmission, such as measles. We carry out a similar
investigation for smallpox-specific disease history and vaccine
properties, with similar results. This analysis illustrates the
importance of considering discrete, contact-structured populations
for modeling vaccinating behavior for close contact infections, and
provides a framework for reconciling previous theoretical
predictions concerning the ineradicability of infectious diseases
under voluntary vaccination to the empirical fact of the global
eradication of smallpox and local elimination of many other
infectious diseases through voluntary vaccination.
Methods
Here we describe the social contact network, infection
transmission, and assumptions regarding individual vaccinating
behavior. Definitions of parameters and corresponding parameter
values appear in Table 1. We consider the case of a single
epidemic outbreak. Because demographic processes are relatively
slow on this timescale, we use a static network that does not
include birth or death (other than due to the disease). An outbreak
scenario was chosen, rather than an endemic situation, because
the epidemiology of an infectious disease close to being eradicated
is more aptly described in terms of stochastic outbreaks rather than
sustained endemic transmission. The neighborhood size (node
degree) of the network is Poisson-distributed with mean n. The
network is formed by adding links to randomly selected nodes until
the desired value of n has been reached. After this, no further links
are added, and the infection is introduced by inoculating I0
randomly chosen nodes out of a population of size N~5000
composed of susceptible individuals. We chose I0~10 to ensure
that outbreaks did not fail simply due to stochastic effects.
Additionally, we ensured nI0%N so that successful outbreaks
could go through at least two generations before depleting the pool
of susceptible individuals. Hence, we expect results to be similar on
larger networks. There is a probability b per day at which an
infectious node infects a neighboring susceptible node. Hence, if a
susceptible node has ninf infectious neighbors on a given day, the
total probability l that the node becomes infected on that day is
l~1{ 1{b ðÞ
ninf : ð1Þ
The timestep of the simulation is one day, and each node’s status is
updated at the end of each day.
On any given day, each individual who has not already
vaccinated decides whether or not to vaccinate depending upon
their perceived risk of infection from neighbors versus the
perceived risks of vaccination. We assume that infectiousness
coincides with the onset of symptoms, and that individuals base
vaccination decisions upon the presence of symptoms in a
neighbor. If an individual has ninf infected neighbors, we assume
that the perceived probability lperc per day of being infected today
Author Summary
Interest in infectious disease models that incorporate the
effects of human behavior has been growing in recent
years. However, most of these models predict that it should
never be possible to eradicate a disease under voluntary
vaccination, due to nonvaccinating ‘‘free riders’’ that
emerge when vaccine coverage is high. This prediction
contradicts the fact that smallpox was eradicated under a
voluntary vaccination policy in many jurisdictions, and that
other diseases such as polio are likewise near eradication.
These previous models assumed that populations mix
homogeneously. However, for some diseases, such as HIV
and smallpox, individuals are more likely to get the disease
from certain social contacts. Here we show that using a
network model that captures this social structure can
reconcile the previous theories to the empirical fact that
diseases can be eradicated under voluntary vaccination.
Wheninfectionistransmittedonlythroughclosecontactsin
the network, then an outbreak can be quickly contained
using only voluntary vaccination. However, when infection
can potentially be transmitted to almost everyone in the
network (such as for measles), a disease outbreak can never
be contained using voluntary vaccination. This latter
observation may have some relevance to the Measles–
Mumps–Rubella autism ‘‘vaccine scare.’’
Contact Networks & Vaccination
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lperc~1{ 1{bperc
 ninf
: ð2Þ
where bperc is the perceived probability per day that the individual
is infected by a single given infectious neighbor. If the payoff PV
for vaccinating exceeds the payoff PN for not vaccinating, then the
individual seeks and acquires vaccination on that day. If the
individual does not vaccinate today, the individual can still
vaccinate on following days.
SEIR Infection
For the vaccine-preventable SEIR infectious disease, we assume
that a newly-infected person remains in the latent stage for a
duration of time drawn from a gamma probability density function
(PDF) with a mean of 1=s days and a variance of Vs days
2. After
this time, the individual becomes infectious and remains so for a
duration of timedrawn from a gamma PDF with a mean of 1=c and
a variance of Vc days
2. Subsequently, the individual either dies with
perceived probability dinf due to fatal disease complications, or
recovers to lifelong immunity with perceived probability 1{dinf.A
gamma PDF was used for its convenience and realism [26]. The
vaccine has efficacy e and is assumed to confer lifelong immunity.
The currency of the payoff functions is the number of life-years that
the individual can expect to accrue as a result of their strategy
choice. We do not consider non-fatal outcomes such as long-term
health conditions and we assume that the start of infectiousness
coincides with the appearance of symptoms. We also assume a
relatively high baseline perceived probability of death due to
vaccine, dvac~10{3, to reflect the fact that individuals often have
inflated perceptions of vaccine risks [27,28].
We first consider the payoff PN for not vaccinating today. If the
individual does not vaccinate, s/he is either infected today (with
perceived probability of infection lperc) or not (with probability
1{lperc). If the individual is infected today, then s/he experiences
fatal disease complications with probability dinf, accruing no
additional life years. If the individual survives (probability 1{dinf),
s/he can expect to accrue L additional life years, where L is the
average remaining life expectancy for an individual who has
lifelong immunity to the disease. Hence, the payoff if the
nonvaccinating individual is infected is 1{dinf

L. On the other
hand, if the nonvaccinating individual escapes infection today,
then s/he receives a payoff of a. This payoff represents the
individual’s expected remaining life years, given that they remain
susceptible today because they were neither vaccinated nor
infected. The total payoff PN to an individual who does not
vaccinate today is therefore
PN~ 1{lperc

azlperc 1{dinf

L

ð3Þ
The parameter a is influenced by the likelihood of being infected
or of being compelled to vaccinate later on during the current
epidemic oubreak in the population, and the likelihood that these
result in death. It is impractical to derive a closed form expression
for the probabilities of all these events in order to generate an
expression for a. Also, in reality, individuals may resort to ‘‘rules of
thumb’’ when weighing future outcomes. However, it is reasonable
in any case to expect avL, since a person with immunity can
expect to outlive a person without immunity, on average.
Over time horizons longer than the current epidemic, other
factors may contribute to what assumptions must be made about
a. For instance, if vaccine-derived immunity wanes and the
population is subject to another outbreak 20 years hence, then
vaccination today may appear less favourable, even if avL is still
valid. However, these distant future events would be heavily
discounted [29] and so we will restrict our time horizon to the
current outbreak only.
Due to uncertainties in exactly how much a is less than L, for
our baseline analysis we assume a~L (though we explore a=L in
sensitivity analysis). This makes nonvaccinating behavior more
attractive and hence is a conservative assumption with respect to
demonstrating the success of voluntary vaccination in containing
outbreaks in a contact-structured population: if voluntary
vaccination can control an oubreak for a~L, it should also be
absent when avL. In the baseline scenario, we assume L~40
years, representing the average remaining life expectancy in good
health in a typical developed country [30]. We note that the
baseline value of L does not change the model dynamics
qualitatively or quantitatively, since a scales with L (subject to
above assumptions about future outbreaks).
We next compute the payoff PV to vaccinate today. If a person
chooses to vaccinate, then either the vaccine is efficacious (probability
e), or not (probability 1{e). We suppose that the vaccine carries a
perceived probability dvac of death due to complications from the
vaccine, where dvac is generally small. (Under the assumption of
perfect information, we note that dvac could also be interpreted as the
empirical probability of death.) If the vaccine is efficacious but results
in fatal complications, then no additional life years are accrued.
However, if the vaccine is efficacious and no complications ensue,
then the individual receives a payoff
1{dvac ðÞ L ð4Þ
By comparison, if the vaccine is not efficacious, then either the
individual dies from vaccine complications, accruing zero
Table 1. Baseline parameter values for SEIR-type infection.
Parameter Meaning Value Reference
N Population size 5,000
I0 Initial number of individuals
inoculated with smallpox
10
n Mean neighborhood size 10
b Probability of node-to-node
transmission
0.02
day
21
[50]
bperc Perceived probability of
node-to-node transmission
0.02
day
21
[50]
1=s Mean duration of latent period 12 days [51]
Vs Variance of latent period 4 days
2 [51]
1=c Mean duration of infectious period 19 days [51]
Vc Variance of infectious period 4 days
2 [51]
dinf Probability of death due to infection 0.3 [52,53]
dvac Probability of death due to
vaccine-related complications
0.001 [36]
e Vaccine efficacy 0.95 [50]
a Payoff for individuals with
continued susceptibility
40 life-
years
[30]
L Payoff for individuals with
lifelong immunity
40 life-
years
[30]
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000280.t001
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die (probability 1{dvac). If the individual does not die from the
vaccine, then either the individual is infected today, or the
individual is not infected today. If the individual is not infected
today (probability 1{lperc), then the individual has escaped both
death due to the vaccine and infection and remain susceptible, so
their payoff will be a. However, if the person is infected
(probability lperc), then they suffer a perceived probability dinf of
dying due to the disease, but if they survive (probability 1{dinf),
their payoff is lifelong immunity, or L accrued life-years. Hence, in
the case that the vaccine is not efficacious, the total payoff is
1{dvac ðÞ 1{lperc

azlperc 1{dinf

L

ð5Þ
and from Equations 4 and 5, we have
PV~e 1{dvac ðÞ L fg z
1{e ðÞ 1{dvac ðÞ 1{lperc

azlperc 1{dinf

L
  ð6Þ
On any given day, if
PVwPN ð7Þ
then the individual decides to vaccinate. Otherwise they may still
vaccinate in future according to the same decision rules, and with
no influence from their previous decision history.
Smallpox Infection
To tailor the model to the case of smallpox, we incorporate a more
realistic description of the natural history of smallpox and the effects
of vaccination. We incorporate the fact that conventional smallpox
vaccine can work in individuals who are already infected: those who
receive the vaccine within 3 days of infection usually do not become
infectious and subsequently recover with long-term immunity, those
whoreceive the vaccine4–7days post-exposure experience less severe
symptoms but will be as infectious as an unvaccinated person, and
those who receive the vaccine more than 7 days post-exposure gain
no benefit [31]. Assumptions about network structure were the same
a sf o rt h eS E I R - t y p ei n f e c t i o n .F o rt h ec a s eo fs m a l l p o x ,w eu s e da n
empirical value of dvac~2:7|10{6 [32], thoughwe discussthe effect
of using larger values of dvac.
To compute payoffs for the case of smallpox, we accounted for
both fatal and non-fatal outcomes, such as pockmarks or blindness
due to vaccine or disease. In order to compare fatal and non-fatal
health outcomes in the same payoff function, the payoffs were
expressed in terms of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), i.e., the
number of life years accrued, multiplied by a utility score between
0 (death) and 1 (perfect health) to reflect quality of life during those
years [33]. Utilities for each possible health state after vaccination
or smallpox infection were obtained from the literature. The
payoff functions for the generic vaccine-preventable infection
(Equations 3 and 6) were thus adjusted to obtain the payoff
functions for the case of smallpox:
PN~ 1{lperc

azlpercd, ð8Þ
PV~ekz 1{e ðÞ 1{lperc

tzlpercd

, ð9Þ
where d is the payoff to a person who becomes infected today by
smallpox, k is the payoff to a person who vaccinates today and in
whom the vaccine has been efficacious (but who may experience
complications or death due to vaccine), and t is the payoff to a
person who vaccinates today and in whom the vaccine is not
efficacious, but who avoids becoming infected today (and who may
experience complications or death due to vaccine). Details of the
derivation, as well as the full expressions for d, k, and t in terms of
model parameters and utilities appear in Text S1. We note that
k&L, t&a, and dvL at realistic parameter values. Again we
assume a~L for our baseline scenario. Parameter values appear
in Text S1. An equation analogous to Equation 10 can also be
derived, with a similar interpretation.
Results
It is possible to show from Equations 3 and 6 that an individual
with at least one infectious neighbor will vaccinate (i.e., PVwPN
for the individual) if and only if
bpercw
dvac
dinf ez 1{e ðÞ dvac ½ 
: ð10Þ
The derivation of this expression appears in Text S1. We note
that e&0:95 for many common vaccines. Also, dvac%dinf in most
cases except when individuals have unrealistically inflated
assessment of vaccine risks, such as during a ‘‘vaccine scare.’’
Therefore, whether or not an individual with at least one infectious
neighbor vaccinates hinges largely upon the value of bperc.I fbperc
is sufficiently high then self-interested (rational) vaccinating
behavior will result in eradication in a contact-structured
population. (We note that rational behavior is precisely what
causes failure to eradicate in a homogeneously-mixing population
under a voluntary vaccination policy [4].) On the other hand, if
bperc is sufficiently small, then an individual with at least one
infectious neighbor may not judge the risk of infection great
enough to vaccinate, and the infection may thereby spread
through the entire population. We note that Equation 10 holds
regardless of the assumed network structure.
Low values of bperc may occur for an infectious diseases where
the number of social contacts through which infection can
potentially be transmitted is large, but the probability of becoming
infected from any single given contact is small. For instance, the
number of potential effective contacts for measles transmission is
large: the virus can be transmitted through aerosolized droplets
that remain airborne for long periods, therefore the list of
individuals to whom measles infection can potentially be passed is
very large. However, even in a fully susceptible population, only
10–20 of these individuals are actually infected [34]. By
comparison, we note that bperc may be high for a sexually
transmitted or close contact infection, where the list of contacts to
which infection can be transmitted may be small, but the
probability of transmission to each contact is high.
In the present model, as the average neighborhood size
increases and the node-to-node transmission rate declines
correspondingly, we should therefore expect to find conditions
where Equation 10 is violated and voluntary vaccination fails to
contain the outbreak, as predicted by models that assume
homogeneous mixing. To test for this, we simulated the spread
of the SEIR-type and smallpox infections on the network under a
wide range of possible values for the average neighborhood size n.
For each value of n tested, the value of the node-to-node
transmission rate b was adjusted so that the average force of
infection per susceptible node remained the same as for the
baseline parameter values. Holding the average force of infection
Contact Networks & Vaccination
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change in model dynamics is thereby attributable to a decline in
how localized the contact network is, rather than an increase in the
overall force of infection (see [35] for an analogous approach for
the effects of concurrency). Method I for maintaining constant
infection risk assigned b~0:2=n day
21 for each value of n tested
(where n|b~10|0:02 day
21=0.2 day
21 for the baseline
parameters). Hence, a doubling of the number of social contacts
would reduce the node-to-node transmission rate by half, which
should maintain approximately the same infection risk per
susceptible node as in the baseline scenario. However, higher-
order effects relating to network structure are not accounted for in
this approach and could change the infection risk in subtle ways.
Therefore, we also controlled for infection risk using Method II,
which involved calibrating the value of b to ensure the measured
infection risk was the same across all neighborhood sizes. For each
value of n, simulations were run for a range of finely stratified b
values. The value of b which yielded a final epidemic size within
0.2% of the average baseline final size of 10 realizations was
selected. Hence, for each value of n, we know a corresponding
value of b for which a given susceptible person has the same
chance of becoming infected as for the baseline scenario. The
simulations were run in a population without vaccination, since
the goal was to obtain a range of infections with the same average
risk to individuals but varying neighbourhood sizes, and including
vaccination would thus bias this calibration. All other parameters
were as in Table 1, except we maintained bperc~b throughout.
For the SEIR-type infection, the simulation results under
Method I indicate that voluntary vaccination contains the
outbreak until the average neighborhood size nw57 (Figure 1A).
Below this threshold, both the final size and total number
vaccinated remain small, since the outbreak is easily controlled
through voluntary ring vaccination. Above this threshold, each
infected node infects more than one neighboring node on average
(usually a nonvaccinator with insufficient infectious neighbors to
compel him/her to vaccinate). As a result, the infection breaks
through imperfect rings of vaccinated individuals, and percolates
through the entire network until almost all individuals have been
either vaccinated or infected. This outcome is qualitatively similar
to the divergence between individually and socially optimal
strategies observed in homogeneous mixing models–these exhibit
regimes where a large number of individuals can choose to
vaccinate, but never enough to eradicate the disease completely
[4]. The simulation results under Method II are very similar, with
failure of voluntary vaccination materializing once nw45
(Figure 1B). Hence, social contact structure can enable outbreak
containment even when the neighborhood size is relatively large.
We note that for avL, the threshold values of n would be higher.
For smallpox infection, voluntary vaccination contains the
outbreak for all nv800 (Figure 1C and 1D). This difference
compared to the SEIR-type infection is attributable mainly to the
difference in the perceived probability of death due to the vaccine,
dvac. In the case of the SEIR-type infection, the perceived
probability was taken to be a relatively high dvac~10{3, since
individuals tend to inflate vaccine risks [36]. However, for
smallpox, we used the empirical value dvac~2:7|10{6. There-
fore from Equation 10 we observe that value of b must be very low
(i.e., n must be very large) before voluntary vaccination fails to
contain the outbreak. This would require a simulated population
size on the order of N~1 million, but our simulation became
prohibitively slow beyond n~800. We note that homogeneous
mixing models assume the continuum approximation holds, such
Figure 1. Final size and number vaccinated versus average neighborhood size for an SEIR-type infection, under Method I (A) and
Method II (B), and for smallpox, Method I (C) and Method II (D). N~5000. Error bars represent two standard deviations from the mean across
20 simulations per datum.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000280.g001
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should fail to contain an outbreak even for arbitrarily small
vaccine risks and arbitrarily high case fatality rates. Simulations for
smallpox with an inflated dvac~10{3 are similar to those for the
SEIR-type infection, with voluntary vaccination not failing until
the neighborhood size is significant.
We also carried out a univariate sensitivity analysis with respect
to the payoff a to individuals who remain susceptible, the node-to-
node transmission rate b, and the vaccine efficacy e. As each of
these parameters was separately varied, the other parameters were
kept at the baseline values. For the SEIR-type infection, in the case
of varying a, we observe that voluntary vaccination contains the
outbreak for all av40:2 (Figure 2A). For av39:99, vaccination
appears attractive even in the absence of an infected neighbor, and
all individuals vaccinate. For 39:99ƒaƒ40:2, vaccination is
attractive when there is one or more infectious neighbors, and the
outbreak is controlled through voluntary ring vaccination. When
aw40:2, vaccination only becomes attractive once the number of
infectious neighbors is already quite large (i.e., too large to prevent
further transmission), and hence the final size is very large. As a
grows, the final size continues to grow and the number who seek
vaccination continuously decline, since vaccination becomes
progressively less attractive for larger a. However, as discussed
in the Methods section, biologically realistic solutions are restricted
to avL. The final size and number vaccinated is not strongly
dependent on the transmission rate b (Figure 2B). This is not
surprising, since for small n individuals rapidly vaccinate once it
becomes known they have an infectious social contact, preventing
further transmission. In the case of varying vaccine efficacy e we
observe that the final size increases monotonically as e drop below
0.7 (Figure 2C). The number vaccinated is highest for
0:1vev0:6. Below e~0:1, the number vaccinated is small
because the vaccine is not efficacious enough to justify the
individual decision to vaccinate. Above e~0:6, the number
vaccinated is small because voluntary ring vaccination contains the
outbreak relatively quickly. Results are similar for smallpox (Figure
S1). We also tested the robustness of model predictions to several
extensions, such as including delays in time required for the
vaccine to confer immunity, probabilistic descriptions of the
individual decision-making process, and the possibility that
individuals may choose to vaccinate once their neighbor’s
neighbors become infected, but found no major qualitative
differences in model dynamics at biologically realistic parameter
values (results not shown).
Figures S2 and S3 depict several representative time series for
the SEIR-type and smallpox infections respectively, at the baseline
parameters values. As expected, secondary and tertiary transmis-
sion is limited in the baseline scenario, and occur only because of
vaccine failures in some individuals. After each instance of
secondary transmission, neighbors of the new case vaccinate and
the outbreak is quickly controlled.
Discussion
It is now a well-established principle in theoretical population
biology that the dynamics of spatially structured populations can
differ significantly from the dynamics of unstructured populations
[37–39]. In spatially structured populations, coexistence, diversity
andaltruismdevelop more easily[40,41], evolutionaryvelocitiesare
slower [42], and epidemics have more realistic time series and
critical community sizes [43]. Similar differences have been
observed in the case of network models versus homogeneous
mixing models [19–23]. The present model likewise illustrates
dramatic changes in behavior-infection dynamics once social
contact structure is introduced. When populations mix homoge-
neously, ‘‘rational’’ self-interested behavior leads to a divergence
between individually and socially optimal strategies: vaccination
coverage canbe high, but never high enough to eradicate a vaccine-
preventable infection. By comparison, the same kind of self-
interested behavior in networks where contact structure is
sufficiently local can rapidly and efficiently curtail outbreaks in
discrete, contact-structured populations, through voluntary ring
vaccination. This work also illustrates the importance of discrete
effects in structured populations [37]. Events at the local, individual
level (as playedout in local neighborhoods on the network) canhave
significant implications for population-level outcomes such as final
size and total number vaccinated. Finally, the present analysis
recovers the homogeneous mixing case in the limit of large
neighborhood size, thus capturing two qualitatively distinct regimes
of behavior-infection dynamics. It thereby provides a framework for
reconciling thepredictionsofbehavior-infectionmodelsthat assume
homogeneously mixing populations to the empirical fact that many
infectious diseases have been either globally eradicated or locally
eliminated despite voluntary vaccination policies.
We expect that our results for SEIR infections should generally
apply to vaccine-preventable infectious diseases where the SEIR
disease history is a good approximation to the actual disease
Figure 2. Final size and number vaccinated versus vaccine
efficacy e (A), future payoff under continued susceptibility a
(B), and node-to-node transmission probability b (C), for the
SEIR-type infection. N~5000. Error bars represent two standard
deviations from the mean across 20 simulations per datum. Note
difference in vertical scale for (C).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000280.g002
Contact Networks & Vaccination
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 6 February 2009 | Volume 5 | Issue 2 | e1000280history, and where appearance of symptoms approximately
coincides with the start of infectiousness. Examples of such
diseases include smallpox (for the small neighbourhood limit), and
measles, rubella, chickenpox, perhaps pertussis (for the large
neighbourhood limit).
The basic reproductive number, R0 (the average number of
secondary infections produced by a single infectious person in an
otherwise susceptible population), is a fundamental measure that
indicates how easily an infectious disease outbreak can be
controlled. However, recent theory points to other aspects of
infectious diseases that may be equally important. For instance,
one such aspect is the proportion of transmission occurring before
the onset of clinical symptoms [44]. Likewise, the current analysis
suggests that whether a disease requires close contact for
transmission may be an important factor determining the
feasibility of outbreak control under voluntary vaccination policies.
Some previous game theoretical models have suggested that
eradication is less likely to occur under voluntary vaccination when
R0 is higher, such as for measles and pertussis [4,5]. The results
from the present analysis dovetail with these earlier predictions,
since diseases with higher R0 are also more likely to be spread
through means other than close personal contact. For these more
transmissible infections, the average neighborhood size is higher
since the number of social contacts that could potentially result in
transmission events is greater. Hence, the results of the present
study also suggest that diseases with higher R0 are more likely to
be associated with failure to eradicate under voluntary vaccina-
tion. The present results also extend previous predictions by
showing how the severity of the disease, as expressed through dinf,
can influence whether voluntary vaccination will work.
It has previously been observed that spatial structure can also
encourage the persistence of cooperative behavior in classical
games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma [45]. This is phenomeno-
logically similar to what occurs in the present study: in a contact-
structured population, what is optimal for the group becomes
coincident with what is optimal for the individual, when
neighborhood size is small enough. In the case of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, small clusters of cooperating individuals can maintain
‘‘equal footing’’ with clusters of defectors, because of the high
cooperate-cooperate payoffs that occur within cooperator clusters.
In the present analysis the mechanism is quite different, having to
do with the large difference in infection risk between those who
neighbor infectious individuals and those who do not. This
individual-level structure cannot be described in a homogeneously
mixing population subject to the continuum approximation [37].
There were several limitations to the present analysis. First, we
assumed that a~L. For a more realistic assumption of avL,w e
would expect a higher threshold in neighborhood size for failure of
voluntary vaccination. In the same vein, the payoff functions are
static and do not reflect expected future disease dynamics. Static
functions were used because we assumed that individuals do not
weigh future outcomes heavily in the face of a current outbreak,
especially if there are significant uncertainties about future disease
dynamics. However, if individuals did make strategic choices
according to expected future disease dynamics, the predictions may
change. A second limitation is that we used a static, random
network. Outcomes may differ for other types of networks. For
instance, in a network with small characteristic path length [46],
infection and vaccination should percolate through the network
more quickly than was the case here, although we do not expect the
final state of the network to change. Similarly, networks with scale-
free neighborhood size distributions [47] may exhibit highly
variable outcomes due to the large heterogeneity in neighborhood
size: an infectious node with many neighbors could lead to a higher
epidemic final size in the whole population, whereas a vaccinated
node with few neighbors could significantly reduce final size.
Finally, if network edges can form and be dissolved, then failure of
voluntary vaccination should emerge for a sufficiently high rate of
turnover of network edges, regardless of neighborhood size. Future
work on behavior-infection dynamics in contact-structured popu-
lations should take into account more realistic networks such as
those derived from household sizes, sexual behavior surveys, or
contact-dairy studies. A third limitation is our assumption that
becoming infective coincides with the appearance of recognizable
symptoms. For diseases where individuals can transmit before
exhibiting symptoms, voluntary ring vaccination would be less
successful and we would expect the thresholds of Figure 1 to shift to
the left. This is because individuals may still become infected if they
wait to vaccinate until their neighbors exhibit symptoms. For
smallpox in particular, some transmission may occur during the
prodrome phase of infection, where individuals exhibit non-specific
symptoms. However, because the contribution from this phase is
relatively small [48] and smallpox has a low R0, we do not expect
this to qualitatively change our results. A fourth limitation is that we
assumed that the vaccine works immediately upon innoculation.
This is plausible for smallpox, since vaccination can prevent both
disease and viral shedding in individuals if they are vaccinated
within three days after becoming infected [31]. However, if a
vaccine requires a sufficiently long time to take effect, waiting to
vaccinate until a neighbor exhibits symptomsagainmaynot prevent
infection (though it may encourage individuals to vaccinate pre-
emptively once disease has entered their local population). Models
that accommodate these alternative possibilities could yield different
predictions, and it is possible to imagine scenarios of disease
propagation through individual-based networks that are analogous
to the ‘‘race to trace’’ that has been described for universal smallpox
vaccination [49]. Finally, we made the standard game theoretic
assumption of ‘‘rational’’ behavior, although humans do not always
act in this way. In this context, one implication is that individuals
may react differently to outbreaks of a disease that has caused
significant mortality very recently, compared to one that has not
caused significant mortality in a long time.
Subject to the above limitations, there are a priori reasons to
think that the basic dynamics illustrated here may describe a wide
range of vaccine-preventable diseases that are spread through
close contact. At the initial stages of an outbreak, the average
prevalence of the disease across the whole population is very low.
In a homogeneously-mixing population where infected persons are
equally likely to make contacts with anyone in the population, the
infection risk to any given individual is therefore also initially
small, and individuals do not immediately seek vaccination. The
disease thus transmits freely until the average prevalence is high
enough to justify vaccinating for the remaining susceptible
individuals. On the other hand, in a socially or spatially structured
population, the short-term infection risk is heterogeneous across
the population: nonexistent for most individuals, but very high for
the immediate neighbors of an infected person. Hence, the
neighbors of an infected person vaccinate as soon as their
neighbor’s symptoms appear. Since these effects are likely to
apply to a broad range of infections spread through close contact,
behavior-infection models of such infections may need to weigh
the potential effects of individual-level contact structure.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Additional details on mathematical derivations and
smallpox parameter values.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000280.s001 (0.10 MB PDF)
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vaccinated on vaccine efficacy epsilon (A), payoff alpha for
continued susceptibility (B), and node-to-node transmission
probability beta per day (C) for smallpox infection. N=5000.
Error bars represent two standard deviations from the mean across
20 simulations per data point.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000280.s002 (0.06 MB PDF)
Figure S2 Representative realizations from the simulation: time
series of number infected and number vaccinated for the SEIR-
type infection. N=5000. Error bars represent two standard
deviations from the mean across 20 simulations per data point.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000280.s003 (0.15 MB JPG)
Figure S3 Representative realizations from the simulation: time
series of number infected and number vaccinated for smallpox
infection. N=5000. Error bars represent two standard deviations
from the mean across 20 simulations per data point.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000280.s004 (0.15 MB JPG)
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